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Abstract
Frequently bilateral, multilateral or regional institutions are used 
to mediate conflict, to overcome collective action problems 
and create the framework for cooperation and governments. 
In recent years multi-polar international organisations have 
become challenged by the highly increased expectations in their 
problems solving capabilities and their lack of means to deliver 
them. The complexity of issues seem to generate a demand 
for closer international cooperation as well as more flexibility 
in the framework of cooperation. Across regions, the level of 
institutional complexity and formal structure of international 
cooperation varies considerably. This is especially in the case 
of East Asia and the relationship between Japan and Korea 
important, since uncertainty over the sincerity of cooperation 
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as well as asymmetric information lead to disruptions in the 
cooperation of both countries. 
　In the classic theoretical sense elaborated by John Nash (1950) 
and Thomas Schelling (1960), a bargaining problem refers to a 
situation where there are multiple self-enforcing agreements or 
possible outcomes that the negotiators would prefer to no agreement. 
Nevertheless in many cases the negotiators disagree on the ranking 
of the mutually preferable agreements. 
1
 As an empirical matter, as 
second characteristic feature of bargaining problems is that they 
are dynamic. They are resolved, if at all, through time (might cause 
bargaining delay), in sequences of offers and counteroffers, or with 
one holding out in hope that the others will make concessions 
(this includes bargaining strategies like commitment strategies). 
A important empirical aspect of bargaining problems is that they 
typically involve uncertainty or asymmetric information about what 
the others side true preferences and constraints are, which opens up 
the possibilities for bluffing and strategic interaction as well as for 
misinterpretation. One issue is arising from asymmetric information 
and explain how institutional setup and competing frameworks are 
able to improve the possibility of overcoming deadlock situations. It 
is important to understand under which conditions cooperation can 
take place and how we can distinguish different bargaining situations. 
Furthermore it is important to understand causes for bargaining 
failure and the important properties of how competing institutional 
frameworks can lead to improved negotiation outcomes.
　Given the understanding of the nature of a bargaining problem, 
1　Chicken and Battle of the Sexes are thus minimal models of such a 
problem. See Schelling 1960 for a more detailed discussion.
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it is apparent that bargaining is an integral part in a large variety of 
international negotiation and cooperation. Regardless of whether 
the specific domain is regional integration, economic coordination, 
environmental regulation or even arms control. There will almost 
always be many possible ways to write the treaty or agreement that 
specifies the terms of cooperation, and the states involved in the 
negotiations will surely have conflicting preferences over some subset 
of the various possibilities. Further, in practice the resolution of such 
a bargaining problem will take place, if at all, in a series of offers 
and counter offers and of course uncertainty about the minimum 
that the other side would accept is often important in international 
cooperation.
　At the same time most efforts of international cooperation also 
involves issues of monitoring and enforcement. Once a deal is stuck 
on the terms of cooperation the next task is typically to implement, 
monitor and enforce an agreement. Only very few international 
agreements may be self implementing and self-enforcing without 
any special arrangements. But in the majority of cases, the parties 
involved recognise that there may be incentives to renegotiate 
some aspects of the deal, if the circumstances are changing and 
they set up governance structures of varying complexity to cope 
with this. 
2
 Therefore it is important to understand intergovernmental 
cooperation as a dynamic process, which is not a one off division of 
a good, but an ongoing process of interaction. It follows then, that 
the empirical problem faced by states contemplating international 
cooperation cannot be grasped by a theoretical framework that 
2　Governance structures may also be desired as means for handling 
unforeseen contingencies, which are often problematic because they 
render unclear what constitutes re-negotiation.
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emphasises a “one off” negotiation situation. In a broad range of 
empirical situations, reaching international cooperation involves first 
a negotiation stage and second a monitoring and enforcement stage. 
In empirical analyses these distinctions are often less obvious and 
therefore difficult to detect in intergovernmental cooperation. It is one 
of the aims of the paper to structure the key features of international 
cooperation from a bargaining perspective. Empirically we can 
observe that multilateral regional institutions are used frequently to 
mediate and facilitate cooperation. However the level of complexity 
and formal structure of these cooperation varies considerably, they 
can constitute a highly structured setup, like the decision making 
process in APEC, with hundreds of different policy issues discussed, 
or it could be a bilateral agreement like “The General Security of 
Military Information Agreement” (GSOMIA) between South Korea 
and Japan, which is primarily tied together by agreement of on single 
issue The aim of this paper is to incorporate the institutional level in 
the bargaining framework and to explore the impact of the variation 
of institutions along the formal-informal continuum (with varying degrees 
of formalisation and legalisation on the negotiation process).
　Within this framework we pay specific attention to the impact of 
asymmetric information uncertainty and bargaining strategies. In 
the following sections we will take a closer look at the bargaining 
mechanism underlying cooperation. 
Differentiation of negotiation situation
　By focusing on the bargaining process and the impact of the 
institutional framework, a further distinction of empirical situations 
should be made. Empirically, problems of international cooperation 
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may involve either by bargaining over the division of new or 
potential benefits, or attempts to renegotiate an excising cooperative 
arrangement, where on party threatens to revert to non-cooperation 
if the terms are not adjusted. 
　In the first class of cases, an external event “opens up” a set of 
deals that all parties would prefer to the status quo. An example 
could be the issue of Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), 
where governments see benefits by having a standardised, free and 
open trade to increase the comparability of economic systems among 
the member-states. Nevertheless, there might be some bargaining 
conflict going on which of the several systems (or parts of systems) 
are the most beneficial and should be agreed on as the new standard. 
　However, this is only one example, we could think of many areas, 
other examples could be that technological and educational changes 
can produce new benefits obtained by international cooperation: like 
the development of the internet and advances telecommunication 
make it possible for government to efficiently share information for 
crime prevention. Of course also new emerging or newly discovered 
problems can be the source of such international cooperation, which 
becomes obvious on issues like environmental problems and a new 
form of global terrorism. 
　The second type of problems of re-negotiation involve states, 
which have already previously negotiated cooperative arrangement 
and some changes lead one or more of the negotiators to ask for re-
negotiations of the terms. Within the framework of NAFTA the recent 
renegotiations between the USA, Mexico and Canada to form the 
new USMCA are a noticeable example, threatened trade wars among 
the USA and the EU provide another possible example. In terms 
of the strategic structure problems of re-negotiations are similar to 
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cases of international crisis bargaining, in which one state threatens 
with conflict in the event of failed efforts of re-negotiation. It should 
be noted, that once the phase of costly non-cooperation has begun, 
problems of international re-negotiation are structurally similar to 
problems of dividing up new benefits. In addition, note that after 
an initial agreement is reached, bargaining problems may recur as 
circumstances change or relative power shifts, leading to efforts 
at re-negotiation, some international organisations build in formal 
arrangements for periodic re-negotiation of prior agreements, and 
to an extent they might even be identified with these institutions of 
re-negotiation. The European Union evolves around constant treaty 
negotiations, which change the “rules of cooperation” frequently.
　Saying that diverse international issue domains can be productively 
viewed as having a common strategic structure does not imply that 
bargaining and enforcement issues arise in the same manner in all 
issue areas if these are considered at a lower level of generality. 
My point is simply that reflection on the empirical problem faced 
by states wishing to cooperate suggests that, taken as dichotomous 
s alternatives, coordination games and Prisoners’ Dilemma-type 
games are misleading theoretical models. Almost regardless of 
the substantive domain, negotiating governments will face both a 
bargaining problem and problems of enforcement, and it is important 
to notice that the two problems interact. 
Conclusion
　For several decades, states have taken institutional frameworks of 
intergovernmental negotiations more serious than scholars. Whereas 
the choice of institutional structure of international cooperation 
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has been neglected in the theoretical study of intergovernmental 
negotiations and cooperation, they have played a major role in 
many instances of interstate collaboration. Therefore it is important 
to understand the impact of an institutional framework on the 
intergovernmental negotiation process. The use of bargaining theory 
can help to explain under which conditions formal institutions lead 
to suboptimal negotiation outcomes or even to negotiation failure. 
The notion of asymmetric information and uncertainty over actors 
preferences, which force governments to use costly signals to reveal 
their ‘true' preferences, should play a central role in this analysis. 
One way to prevent sub-optimal negotiation outcomes is to use 
less formal negotiation procedures. However, informal cooperation 
suffers from other short-comings of lower levels of inclusion and 
centralisation of cooperation. Therefore we further suggests that 
a combination of formal and informal cooperation ― where the 
informal cooperation is treated like an outside option ― might 
reduce the risk of bargaining failure in formal intergovernmental 
cooperation.
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